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ADMIRALTY-SALVAGE-IESCUE OF VESSEL FROM BOLSHEvIKLa-The plaintiffs,
officers; and enlisted men of the British and Belgian forces, rescued a ship from
falling into the hands of the Bolsheviki. The vessel was lying at Murmansk
when that place was taken over by the Reds.. The plaintiffs succeeded, with very
little assistance from the crew, who were inclined to surrender the vessel, in
getting up sufficient steam to get out of the harbour, after a running fight in
which several were wounded. Held,.that this was a sufficient salvage service to
entitle the plaintiffs to compensation from the owners. The Lomonosoff (I92O,
Adm.) 37 T. L. R. IS.
The much lamented change from the glorious days of "wooden ships and iron
men" to the days of "iron ships and wooden men" has not yet taken all the
romance from the sea. There seems to be no authority directly in point, though
there are analogous cases that make as interesting reading as one of Stevenson's
novels. To constitute a salvage service there must be the elements of peril to the
subject-matter of the service and voluntariness on the part of the salvor.
Kennedy, The Law of Civil Salvage (189I) I8. The rescue of vessels from
pira.es and plunderers has been held to be a salvage service. The" Calypso
(1828, Adm.) 2 Hagg. 2og; The Lady Worsley (I855, Adm.) 2 Spink, 253; cf.
13 & 14 Vict. c. 26, sec. 5 (i85o) ; Parter v. The Friendship (1831, D. Mass.)
Fed. Case No. -10,783, Salvage has been allowed to the crew of a vessel that
rescued another vessel from slaves who had overpowered the crew. The Tre-
laurney (i802, Adm.) 4 C. Rob. 223; see The Armistad (1841, U. S.) i5 Pet. 5x8.
But the service must be rendered during the actual insurrection of the slaves.
The Anne (i8o4, Adm.) 5 C. Rob. ioo. It was held to be a salvage service in an
interesting case of a master and boy who recovered a vessel from a prize crew
which had been placed in charge of her, and in another case in -which a vessel
recaptured a prize from an enemy. The Beaver (i8oi, Adm.) 3 C. Rob. 293;
Bas v. Tingey (800, U. S.) 4 Dall. 37. Salvage has not been allowed in those
cases where the loyal members of the crew recovered the vessel from their
mutinous shipmates. The Governor Rdffles (i815, Adm.) 2 Dod. I4; The Francis
and Eliza (i816, Adm.) 2 Dod. 115, 118. The court decided the instant cgeupon
the analogy of a vessel Tecovered from pirates or mutineers, inasmuch as there
was at Murmansk no government recognized by England and no established gov-
ernment at all, and granted the plaintiffs an award for their ineritorious service.
AGENCY-MASTER AND SERVANT-GROUNDS FOR DIsCHARGE-SINGLE 
INSTANCE OF
INTOXICATION.-The plaintiff was an agent in the employ of the defendant real
estate company under the usual, contract requiring him to give his entire time
and energy to the work of" his employment. One afternoon he -came into the
defendant's office in a state of intoxication, incoherent, but not boisterous or
offensive. He was sent home and subsequently was discharged. This action was
brought to recover damages for wrongful discharge. Held, that the question 
of
justification was one of fact for the jury. Herbert v. Wood, Dolson Co. (920,
Sup. Ct.) I'13 Misc. 671, i85 N. Y. 325.
To justify a servait's discharge there must have been a breach of. an express
or implied condition of the contract of service. That he will abstain from
habitual drunkenness is always implied. Bass Furnace Co. v. Glasscock 
(1887)
82 Ala. 452, 2 So. 315. An occasional, or even a single, instance of intoxication
may be a sufficient breach of the implied condition; for, if his conduct islikely
[7571
YALE LAW JOURNAL
to be prejudicial to the interests or reputation of his master, or if it is incom-
patible with the due and faithful performance of his duty, his discharge is justi-
fiable. McEdwards v. Ogilvie (1886) 4 Manitoba, i. Since there clearly can be
no fixed rule of law which, in every case, would determine this question, it
seems properly one for the-jury, with explicit instructions from the court as to
what constitutes a sufficient ground for discharge. Clouston v. Corry [Io6,
H. L.] A. C. 122. But, when the servant's acts are flagrant, the court may hold
as a matter of law that the discharge was justified. See Dorrance v. Hoopes
(1914) 122 Md. 344, 352, go Atl. 92, 95. A choir master may be discharged for
being once intoxicated, because of the effect that condonation of his offense
would have upon his pupils. Martin v. Lane (1885) 3 Manitoba 314. The owner
of a plantation may refuse to turn it over to an overseer who is drunk at the
time. Johnson v. Gorman (i86o) 30 Ga. 612. And a railroad engineer who was
occasipnally noticeably affected by liquor while on duty may be -discharged, since
it would clearly have been negligence on the part of the company towards its
passengers to have retained him. Smith v. Ry. (1895) 6o Minn. 330, 62 N. W.
392. Moreover, it is unnecessary that the drunkenness occur while the servant
is on duty, if he is by it rendered incapable of faithful and efficient performance.
Ulrich v. Hower (1893) I56 Pa. 414, 27 Atl. 243. On the other hand, occasional
intoxication may not be of much importance, as in the case of an apprentice.
Wise v. Wilson (1845, N. P.) i Car. & Kir. 662. Or in the case of seamen, with
whom courts of admiralty are inclined to be rather lenient. The Atlantic (1862,
Adm.) Lush. 566; The El Dorado (1868, D. Mass.) Lowell 289. Under the
circumstances of the principal case, where there is a reasonable doubt as to the
severity of the plaintiff's offense, 'it seems that the court's view that the case
should have been submitted to the jury is correct. Regarding grounds of dis-
missal generally, see (1918) 27 YALE LAw JOURNAL, 954. And as to the damages
recoverable, see (1912) 21 id. 691.
AGENCY-MASTER AND SERvANT-LIABILITY OF MASTER FOR 'INJURY TO VOL-
UNTER.-The defendant's servant, who was operating a motor truck, invited the
plaintiff, a minor; without authority, to assist him in unloading the truck. WF~hile
driving back to the defendant's shop, the plaintiff was asked to 'ride on the
running board to facilitate the driving, and while they were rounding a curve at
considerable speed, he was thrown from the truck and sustained the alleged
injuries. The plaintiff was non-suited. Held, that there should -be a new trial.
Kalmch v. White (192o, Conn.) iii Atl. 845.
The English rule absolves the master on the fellow-servant doctrine; while the
majority of the American. courts reach the same conclusion on the theory that,
the relation of master and servant not existing, the volunteer assumes all risks
and has a cause of action for wilful or wantbn injury- only. For a discussion of
the English and American cases, see (1920) 30 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 85, com-
menting on Heasmer v. Pickfords, Lid. (I92O, K. B.) 36 T. L. R. 818; Grissom
v. Atlanta Ry. (907) 152 Ala. io, 44 So. 661; see Geer v. Sound Transfer. Co'
(1915) 88 Wash. i, 4, 152 Pac. 691, 693. The instant case, however,, places the
volunteer on the same footing as a trespasser. It is generally recognized that
one owes a trespasser the 'duly of using ordinary care to avoid injuring him
after discovering him in a perilous Iposition. Webb zv. Kansas City So. Ry. (1919)
137 Ark. 107, 208 S. W. 301; 29 C-yc. 443. See also (1921) 30 YALE LAW JOURNAL,
201. It is submitted that this step is justifiable in view of the fact that d volunteer
is present to promote.the interests of the' master, while a trespasser is a tort-
feasor. Hence it seems not 'extreme but a logical development to hold that a
volunteer should enjoy at least as advantageous a position as a trespasser. See
Evarts v. St. Paul Ry. (894) 56 Minn. 146, 57 N. W. 459, 460.
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BILLS AND NOTES-CHECKS-CERTIFICATION CONDITIONAL UPON PROCUREMENT
OF INDORSEENT.-The plaintiff as transferee brought action on a check against
the drawee bank, which had returned it for indorsement by the payee, having
certified it in conformity with clearing house rules. Held, that the certification
was here conditioned on the procuring of proper indorsement, without which
the defendant was under no duty. Lipten v. Columbia Trust Co. (i92o) 194 App.
Div. 384, 185 N. Y. Supp. z98.
It is generally stated that certification is equivalent to an acceptance. N. I. L.
sec. 187; First Nat'l Bank v. Currie (19o7) 147 Mich. 72, i1O N. W. 499. How-
ever, some distinctions exist. Certification is different from an acceptance in that
it is not an added, but a substituted, obligation. Tiffany, Banks and Banking
(1912) 131. A check, being payable on demand, calls for payment and not for
acceptance, and, if the holder takes the obligation of the bank for payment, he
thereby discharges the drawer and takes the obligation of the drawee. Times
Square Automobile Co. v. Rutherford Nat'l Bank (i9og) 77 N. J. L. 649, 73 Ai.
479; N. I. L. sec. 188; Tiffany, op. cit., 132. In other respects, no distinction is
made between certification and acceptance. An acceptance not to become opera-
tive until the happening of an event is conditional. Burns & Smith Lumber Co.
v. Doyle (899) 71 Conn. 742, 43 Atl. 483. There seems to be no reason why a
certification may not likewise be conditional. In the case of Meuer v. Phenix
Nat'l Bank (19o4) 94 App. Div. 331, 88 N. Y. Supp. 83, a payee's transferee for
value, without indorsement, was allowed to recover against a bank which had
certified a check without any expressed condition. Since the bank is finder n6
duty to certify a check, it ought to be able, so far as the person for whom it
certifies the check is concerned, to make its certification on such terms and
conditions as it sees fit to impose. In the instant case the intention to make
the certification conditional was plain.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-VESTED RIGHTS-,POWER To REPURCHASE SCHOOL PROP-
ERTY UPON NON-USER.-A school district in the city of Des Moines acquired land
for a school site by purchase and warranty d-ed. A subsequently enacted statute
provided that in case of t.'vo years continuous non-user for school purposes all
land acquired by school districts should revert to the owner of the tract from
which it was taken upon repayment of the purchase price. The statute was sub-
sequently amended to apply only to school districts wholly outside any city or
incorporated town. The school district brought this suit to quiet title, prepara-
tory to a sale of the property for business purposes. Held, that the statute had
created no vested.right in the beneficiary which could not be divested by repeal
or modification of the statute. Independent School Dist. v. Smith (1921, Iowa)
I81 N. W. I.
The constitutional protection of vested rights from legislative interference does
not extend to expectant and contingent interests. See Cooley, Constitutional
Limitations (7th ed. 1903).511. Thus the owner of tide lands has no vested right
in possible future accretion. Western Pac. Ry. v. Southern Pac. Co. (1907,
C. C. A. 9th) I5 Fed. 376, 398. A retroactive statute changing estates in fee tail
to estates in fee simple is valid, since the heir presumptive has no vested right.
Lane v. Davis (1796) 2 N. C. 277; Van Rensselaer v. Poucher (1847, N. Y. Sup.
Ct.) 5 Dep. 35; see 23 Ann. Cas. 62, note. A retroactive statute changing joint
tenancies to tenancies in common is valid, since the right of survivorship is a
mere expectancy. Holbrook v. Finney (18o8) 4 Mass. 565; Miller v. Dennett
(1833) 6 N. H. iog; contra, Greer v. Blanchar (870) 40 Calif. 194. Assuming
the existence of a grantor's possibility of reverter upon the dissolution of a
quasi-public corporation, it is not a vested right. Bass v. Roanoke Navigation
and Water Power Co. (1892) iII N. C. 439, i6 S. E. 402, i9 L. R. A. 247, note.
As to the existence of this possibility of reverter, see (ii9) io MICH. L. REv.*12I.
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The term "vested right" often appears to be used in a broader sense than the
terms "property" and !'estate." For example an inchoate right of dower is
said to be neither property nor a vested righf. Lucas v. Sawyer (1864) 17 Iowa,
517; set i L. R. A. 256, note. But, immediately upon the husband's death the
widow has a vested right (power) protected under the federal Constitution from
legislative control. Bunker v. Barron (1859) 8 Iowa, 132. Before assignment,
however, it is still inalienable at law as property though assignable in equity.
Huston v. Seeley (1869) 27 Iowa, 183, 198. Her interest is a mere power to
demand assignment, and, until she exercises 'this power, she has no "property"
right at law. Rausch v. Moore (1878) 48 Iowa, 6II; 1 Washburn, Real Property
(6th ed. i9o2) 257. A power of re-entry, reserved by the grantor of a fee on
condition,.though* inalienable at common law, has been called a vesied right, pro-
tecting the grantor's heir-at-law from the retroactive effect of a statute making
it devisable and alienable, but no distinction was made as to whether the alleged
breach of condition occurred before or after the death of the grantor. See
Southard v. Central Ry. (1856, Sup: Ct.) 26 N. J. L. 13. The interest of a
contingent remainderman, though not at common law an alienable property inter-
est, has been called a vested right. See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Hoppin (1914,
C. C. A. 7th) 214 Fed. 928. But in Oregon it is held that contingent remaindersare mere expectancies and until they actually vest are subject to legislative con-
trol. Lee v. Albro (igig) 91 Ore. 211, 178 Pac. 784. In the instant'case the fee
simple acquired by the school district through purchase was made defeasible by
the statute upon the concurrence of two contingencies: two years' non-user for
school purposesj and the exercise of the power of repurchase by the beneficiary.
The beneficiary, not being the grantor but the owner of the tract from which
the school site was taken, did not have a power of re-entry nor a possibility of
reverter but merely a statutory option to purchase certain land on certain condi-
tions. Waddell v. Board of Directors (I919, Iowa) 175 N. W. 65.- The condition
upon which it might be exercised not having occurred, it is submitted that he
was deprived of no vested right by the amendment. This conclusion seems
unimpeachable in view of the fact that the statute did not exist at the time the
conveyance was made, and so did not enter into the original contract. As .to
the extent. to which existing statutes and decisions enter into contracts and
become subject to the constitutional provision against impairment of c6ntract
obligations, see Willoughby, Constitutional Law (191o) secs. 518-ig; Dodd,
Impairment of the Obligation of Contract by State Judicial Decisions (19o9)
4 ILL. L. REv. 155, 327.
CoNTRAcTS--DuREss-THiRETs To INjuRE THIRD PARTIEs.-In an action to
recover the balance due upon certain promissory notes, the defendant set up the
defence of duress and entered a counterclaim for the rhoney already paid, based
on the fact that the notes were obtained from him by threatening to arrest his
brother-in-law for criminally appropriating funds of the plaintiff bank. The
plaintiff demurred to the counterclaim. Held, that money paid to compound a
felony could not be recovered, Greenbaum, J., basing his decision on the fact
-that threats to prosecute a brother-in-law did not constitute duress. Union Ex-
change National Bank v. Joseph (192o) 194 App. Div. 295, 185 N. Y. Supp. 403.
Duress is a good defence io an action upon a contract because a party is
privileged not to perform an agreement which he did not enter into voluntarily;
i. e., he is under no duty, but has a power to create one by ratification. See
Joyce, Defenses to Commercial Paper (19o7) sec. 1O5; see NOTES (1913) 26 HARv.
L. REV. 255. In early times the legal standard applicable to ascertain the fact
of duress was the resisting power of a man of courage. See i Blackstone,
Commentaries,'13O; i Chitty, Bills of Exchange (iith ed. 1878) 61; 3 Williston,
Contracts (192o) sec. I6oi. Later the standard was dhanged to that of a person
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of ordinary firmness. Chitty, Contracts (iith ed. 1874) 272 (where the text
recognizes the possibility that a battery may constitute duress) ; United States
v. Huckabee (1872, U. S.) 16 Wall. 414, 432; Ortt v. Schwartz (i916) 62 Pa.
Super. Ct. 70. This, in turn, in some jufisdictions has been extended -from an
extrinsic standard to an individual one, depending on the character and power
of resistance of the person seeking relief. See Joyce, 10c. cit.; 3 Williston,
op. cit., sec. 16o3; see NOTES (1913) 1 VA.'L. REV. 481, 483; Galusha v. Sherman
(igoo) 1o5 Wis. 263, 81 N. W. 495. In general, threats against a wife, husband,
parent, Qr child have been held to constitute duress. Rostad v. Thorsen (1917)
83 Ore. 489, 163 Pac. 423; Spoerer v. Wehland (1917) 130 Md. 226, 1oo Atl. 287;
see L. R. A. I915D, 112o, note. 'In the more liberal jurisdiction threats against
other relatives have been held sufficient. Fountain v. Bighain (1912) 235 Pa. 35,
84 Atl. 131 (son-in-law); Sharon v. Gager (1878) 46 Conn. 189 (nephew);
Davies v. London & P. Marine Ins. Co. (1878) L. R. 8 Ch. Div. 469 (friend) ;
26 L. R. A. 64, note. The modern tendency seems to be toward the individual
standard. See NoTEs (192o) 20 CoL. L. REv. 8o. Statutes govern duress in some
states now. Pendleton v. Greever (192o, Okla.) 193 Pac. 885; Merchant's Col-
lection Agency v. Roantree (1918) 37 Calif. App. 88, 173 Pac. 6oo. Applying the
individual standard, blood ties and relationship should have no operative effect
of themselves. See 3 Williston, op. cit., sec. 1621. Wherever duress has actually
been found to exist, the courts appear to have granted relief irrespective of any
relationship of the parties. Therefore, it would seem that the dissenting opinion
in the principal case is in accord with the better and more liberal rule.
CONTRACTS-USAGE AND CusTom-WHEN ADMISSIBLE AS PART OF CONTRACT.-
The plaintiff contracted to sell to the defendant, a wholesale dealer, 5o,000 tons
of coal to be shipped in equal monthly instalments, for twelve fnonths beginning
December 30, 1915. The amount of coal called for per month was never actually
delivered, but the defendant paid for what he got. During the period September-
November the plaintiff delivered 8,400 tons, but the defendant refused to pay for
a substantial .part of it. In an action for goods sold and delivered the defendant
set up a eounterclaim for damages 'for breach of contract during September-
November, whereupon the plaintiff pleaded a usage, that where cars were not
available for the full amount of coal contracted for, the coal would be appor-
tioned pro rata among the vendees. Evidence was admitted to prove the usage,
to which the defendant excepted. Held, that evidence of the usage as part of the
contract was admissible. Nicoll v. Pittsein Coal Co. (192o, C. C. A. 2d) 269
Fed. 968.
In the instant case no question as to the existence, reasonablenes s, legality, or
other necessary elements of the usage is involved. See 2 Williston, Contracts,
(1920) secs. 657-661; 27 R. C. L. 154-168. Nor is the usage offered to interpret
the language of the agreement. See 2 Williston, op. cit., sec. 65o; 4 Wigmore,
Evidence (195o) sec. 2464. But if admissible, the facts of the usage are added
to and become part of the agreement itself. The general way of expressing the
rule is that where the usage varies or contradicts the written terms of the instru-
ment, it is not admissible. United Steel & Metal Corp. v. Catevenis (Ig2o,.App.
Div.) 182 N. Y. Supp. 879; Guild v. Sampson (1919) 23Z Mass. 509, 122 N. E. 712.
This is fallacious, because any usage if admitted is bound to vary the writing.
The principal case applies what seems to be the better test, namely, whether or
not the parties intended to include the usage. Huumfrey v. Dale (1857, Q. B.)
7 El. & BI. 266, 274; see 4 Wigmore, op. cit., secs. 2430, 2440; 2 Williston, op. cit.
secs. 651-652. The presumption is that unless it is specifically excepted, both
parties contracted with reference to it. Lillard v. Ky. Distilleries & Warehouses
(i9o4, C. C. A. 6th) 134 Fed. 168; see 2 Williston, op. cit., sec. 656. But thi
usage is not admissible if, when it is included in the agreement, it would be
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clearly repugnant to the other terms. See Humfrey v. Dale, supra, per Lord
Campbell. The cases are in confusion and the courts appear to decide each case
according to its own peculiar circumstances. Sutro v. Heilbut [1917, C. A.] 2
K. B. 348 (transportation by land substituted in term of contract specifying
transportation by water, when necessary); McDonald v. Union Hay Co. (igig)
I43 Minn. 4o, 172 N. W. 89i (usage admitted to show requirement of 24 hour
ultimatum before breach could be operative); but see contra, Hart v. Cort
(914) i65 App. Div. 583, isi N. Y. Supp. 4 (usage not admissible to show that
license to produce play meant an exclusive license). If in the instant case the
contract had called for delivery unconditionally, the usage would be clearly
repugnant. But the words of the contract are not such as specifically to exclude
the usage. Thus it seems that in admitting the usage, the principal case is in
accord with the better view.
CRIMINAL LAw-SCIENTER AND INTENT UNNECESSARY IN STATUTORY CRIMES.-
The plaintiff junk dealer was indicted and pleaded guilty under section i69 of
the federal Criminal Code, which declares that "whoever, without lawful author-
ity, shall have in his possession" any die which could be used in counterfeiting
United States coin, shall be punished. He made an explanatory statement to
the court outside his pleadings that the dies came into his possession without his
knowledge in a purchase of junk. He then sued out a writ of habeas corpus,
and contended that the law was contrary to the Fifth Amendment in that it
made criminal a possession which was neither willing nor conscious. Held, that
the law was constitutional. Baender v. Barnett (I92I) 41 Sup. Ct. 271.
In deciding the case the court states that the statute must be construed as
intending to make criminal only a willing and conscious possession of such dies,
and that by pleading not guilty and showing his ignorance of the presence of them
he would not have been convicted. The rule at common law is that. a mere
intention to commit a crime without any overt act accompanying it, or a mere
overt act with no intention to commit a crime is not punishable. I Bishop, New
Criminal Law (8th ed. 1892) secs. 2o4-2o8. In statutory crimes, a criminal intent
not connected with any overt act may not be punished as a crime, and any
statute purporting to do so is unconstitutional. EX parte Smith (1896) 135 Mo.
223, j6 S. W. 628; Proctor v. State (i918, Okla. Cr. App.) 176 Pac. 771. It is
held that an overt act done contrary to the letter of the statute, but with no
criminal intent to violate it, is punishable as a crime. People v. Etmmons (1913)
J78 Mich. 126, i44 N. W. 479; State v. Smith (ig2o, Mont.) i9o Pac. io7.
However, it has been stated that even an unconscious possession of a pro-
hibited article would be sufficient ground for a valid conviction, though "a con-
viction would be unlikely." See People v. Johnson (I919) 288 Ill. 442, 445, 123
N. E. 543, 545. Where a storekeeper sold naphtha under a trade name of
"Lustro," not knowing it was naphtha, he was found guilty under a statute
forbidding its sale. Gately v. Taylor (1912) 211 Mass. 6o, 97 X. E. 61g. The
same result was reached in a sale of oleomargarine. State v. Newton (i885,
Sup. Ct.) 5o N. J. L. 534. It is submitted that under sufficient necessity the
legislatures might declare even a totally unconscious possession of an article
sufficient ground for a valid conviction.
INSURANCE-STANDARD FIRE POLIcY-VALIDITY OF THE CO-INSURANCE CLAUSE.-
The plaintiff was insured with the defendant company under a fire policy in the
standard form. The defendant inserted in this policy a co-insurance clause by
which, if the plaintiff failed to carry insurance up to 8o per cent of the value
of the property, the defendant would not be. liable for a greater proportion of
any loss than the sum insured bears to 8o per cent of the value of the property
at the time of loss. The standard policy laws permit the addition of clauses,
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provided that no such clause is "inconsistent with or a waiver of any of the
conditions of the standard fire insurance policy." In the absence of such a co-
insurance clause the terms of the standard policy secure to the insured payment
of his entire loss up to the amount of the insurance. The pro rata clause of the
standard fire policy provides that "This company shall not be liable for a greater
proportion of any loss or damage than the amount hereby insured shall bear to
the whole insurance covering the property, whether valid or not and whether
collectible or not." The plaintiff failed to carry insurance up to 8o per cent of
the value of his property, and, in an action to recover for a loss, the defendant
set up the co-insurance clause as a bar to full recovery. The plaintiff, contended
that this clause was inconsistent with the standard fire policy and void. Held,
that the co-insurance clause was valid, since the pro rata clause was meant to
include co-insurance, and sipce the legislature must be deemed to have consideredl
this clause valid from its long continued use with the legislature's knowledge.
Page, J., dissenting. Aldrich v. Great Amer. Ins. Co. (1921, App. Div.) 186 N. Y.
Supp. 569.
The purpose of the standard fire policy laws was primarily to protect the
insured against unusual and unnoticed conditions which would serve to defeat
his well grounded expectations. Quinlan %I. Insurance Co. (1892) 133 N. Y. 356,
31 N. E. 31; Gazzam,v. Insurance Co. (19I1) I55 N. C. 330,71 S. E. 434; Vance,
Insurance (I9O4) 432. Contracts of insurance made in any other form are
wholly unenforceable as against the insured, but are enforceable as against the
insurer. Armstrong v. Insurance Co. (1893) 95 Mich. 137, 54 N. W. 637; Hicks
v. Ass. Co. (19oo) 162 N. Y. 284, 56 N. E. 743. The rule of construction in favor
of the insured applies to the standard policy as strictly as it formerly applied to
the old forms. Matthews v. Insurance Co. (1897) 154 N. Y. 449, 456, 48 N. E.
751, 752; Davis & Co. v. Insurance Co. (I897) 115 Mich. 382, 73 N. W. 393. The
co-insurance clause has been held inconsistent with the Kentucky valued policy
laws and thus void. Sachs v. Insurance Co. (1902) 113 Ky. 88, 67 S. W. 23;
Hartford Ins. Co. v. Henderson Brewing Co. (1916) I68 Ky. 715, 182 S. W. 852.
In several states the co-insurance clause is expressly forbidden by statute. See
Mo. Rev. St. 19o9, sec. 7023; Wis. St. 1911, sec. 1943a; Alsop Process Co. v.
Insurance Co. (1914) 175 Mo. App. 317, 162 S. W. 313. Some of these states
forbid it except upon the express written request of the insured upon a form
prescribed by statute. See Supp. Code Iowa 1913, sec. 1746; Mich. Comp. Laws
1915; secs. 9484-9489; Att'y General v. Commissioner of Ins. (I907) 148 Mich.
566, 112 N. W. 132. The court in the instant case concedes that "The co-insurance
clause is a dangerous thing for a person who does not understand it . . . in
the sense that he will not get what he thinks he is going to get." An examina-
tion of the clause and the labored explanation of the pro rata clause given in the
opinion suggests 'that the average insured-if perchance he should read his
policy-would not understand it. And the very purpose of the standard fire
policy was to prevent such clauses from depriving the insured of "what le
thinks he is going to get:" The plain meaning of the pro rata clause would seem
to forbid the interpretation placed upon it by the court. Nor is there any ade-
quate reason why silence on the part of the legislature should be construed as
giving consent to it. It is submitted, therefore, that the co-insurance clause
should have been held invalid, a result reached in a recent case in the New York
Supreme Court, which the instant case overrules. Durham v. Insurance Co.
(192o, Sup. Ct.) 112 Misc. 440, 182 N. Y. Supp. 887.
INSURANCE-WARRANTY OF SEAWORTHINESS--WAIVER AND EsToPPx.-The in-
surance company's inspector reported to it that the ship in question was an
undesirable risk. Later, the company issued a policy at a higher rate than usual,
containing a warranty of seaworthiness. There was some evidence that at that
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time a different report as to the ship's condition had been returned. Held, that
a charge to the jury that the insurance company would be liable despite the
warranty, if it knew the ship was unseaworthy and took the risk at a higher
premium, should be upheld. American Marine Ins. Co. v. Ford Corp. (i92o,
C. C. A. 2d) 269 Fed. 76.
Warranties in insurance are in the nature of conditions precedent, in that
upon strict compliance with them in every particular depend all rights of the
insured in the'policy. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Rutherford (igoo) 98 Va.
195, 35 S. E. 361; Ala, Gold Life Ins. Co. v. Johnston (1887) 8o Ala. 467, 2 So.
i2j; but see Chambers v. Northwestern Mutual Life Ins. Co. (1896) 64 Minn.
495, 497, 67 N. W. 367, 368 (condition subsequent). By some courts, it has been
held that if a warranty is not in fact complied with, the policy cannot be the
foundation -of any rights, regardless of the knowledge of the insurer of the
actual condition of the risk at-the time the insurance attached. State Mutual
Ins. Co. -P. Arthur (1858) 30 Pa. 315; Franklin Fire Ins. Co. v. Martin (i878)
40 N. J. L. 568. This result is reached through the view that as to a repre-
sen tation not true in fact the insurer's "defense will be cut off, where by reason
of his knowledge, there could be no misrepresentation; whereas with regard to
a warranty, his defense is" not fraud or misrepresentation, but failure to perform
a condition precedent, as to which his knowledge or lack of knowledge of prece-
dent facts is immaterial. In the final analysis, an affirmative warranty would
seem to be nothing more than a representation conclusively made material by
the terms of the contract. In regard to both representations and warranties
relating to matters of opinion, the better view would seem to be to hold
the insured merely to good faith, though few courts have been willing to apply
the principle to warranties. Supreme Lodge v. Dickson (1899) 1O2 Tenn. 255,
52 S. V. 86z; Schwarzbach v. Protective Union (x885) 25 W. Va. 622, 657.
"Seaworthiness" is only a relative term depending on the particular service to
be'required of the ship. See 2 Arnould, Marine Insurance (9th ed. 1914) 873;
Vance, Insurance (19o4) 547. The term should not b e construed in a way repug-
nant to the general purpose of the parties at the time the contract was executed.
Thebaud v. Great Western Insurance Co. (1898) 155 N. Y. 516, 50 N. E. 284;
Farmer's Feed Co. v. Insurance Co. (i9o8, C. C. A. 2d) i66 Fed. iii. By the
weight of authority, if the company, through its agents, at the time the risk was
to attach, knew of facts which, by reason of conditions inserted in the contract,
would prevent it from ever attaching, and if the insured was misled by the acts
of the company, it will be estopped to set up the breach of the condition. Van
Schoick v. Niagara Fire Ins. Co. (1877) 68 N. Y. 434. There is undoubtedly a
growing tendency to allow parol evidence to be introduced to set up a waiver
or estoppel, and to admit frankly that in so doing an exception to the parol
evidence, rule is being established in favor of policy holders, because of the
peculiar nature of such contracts. See Welch v. Fire Ass'n of Phila. (1904)
120 Wis. 456, 467, 98 N. W. 227, 230; Spalding v. N. H. Ins. Co. (1902) 71 N. H.
441, 444, 52 Atl. 858, 86o; see (192o) 29 YALE LAW JoURNAL, 795. However, it
is difficult to see how a true estoppel can be worked out in the instant case. A
primary prerequisite for an estoppel is that the insured shall have been misled
by the company. See Vance, op.. cit., sec. 124. There is nothing to show that the
insured here did not intend to make the warranty a part of his obligation, or did
not know it was written in the policy. Furthermore a warranty of seaworthiness
is implied in fact in every contract of insurance on a ship. Van Wickle v.
Mechanics & Trader's Bank (1884) 97 N. Y. 35o; Dixon v. Sadler (1839, Exch.)
5 M. & W. 405, 414. Hence, it cannot be said he was misled by& any act of the
company, and the basis for an estoppel is lacking. Though the doctrine of the
instant case would seem to be inconsistent with the present United States
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Supreme Court rule, it may possibly be justified on the ground that the warranty
was not as to a fact absolutely certain, but as to a matter of opinion, in which
the insured should be held only to good faith.
PRACTICE-LAW OF THE CASE-MATTERS CONCLUDED BY A DECISION OF APPEL-
LATE COURT-The United States Supreme Court reversed a judgment for the
plaintiff on the ground that, in rendering it, the Missouri court disregarded a
judgment of a Connecticut Court which had held an insurance assessment valid.
The Missouri court, upon reconsideration of the case, resolved that the Supreme
Court had left untouched any consideration- of the elements constituting the
assessment and decided that a tax imposed by tie laws of Missouri had beer
unlawfully included in the assessment, which was therefore void. The question
was whether the state court proceeded in consonance with the decision of the
Supreme Court. The defendant contended that the effect of the inclusion of the
tax was presented to the Supreme Court, and that, by its decision, the state court
was precluded from passing upon the validity of the inclusion of the tax
in the assessment. Held, that the inclusion of the tax not having been discussed
in the former decision, the state'court was not precluded from passing on the
question, as omissions do not constitute a part of a decision and become the law
of the case. - Holmes, Van Devanter, and McReynolds, J.J., dissenting. Hart-
ford Life Ins. Co. v. Blincoe (92) 41 Sup. Ct. 276.
When a question arising in the course of litigation has been determined by an
appellate court, it cannot, after remand, be. raised again and relitigated in the
lower court. Black, Law of Judicial Precedents (1912) secs. 81, 83; 4 C. J. 1215;
but see (Igo) 29 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 568. The effect of a decision, as the law
of the case, is restricted to propositions of law actually decided, and such points
as are' necessarily determined by the decision. Parkin v. Grayson-Owen Co.
(914) 25 Calif. App. 269, 143 Pac. 257. Where the judgment actually rendered
could not have been given without deciding a particular question in a particular
way, the decision of it is necessarily implied, although it was not expressly
mentioned. McKinney v. State (1889) 117 Ind. 26, 19 N. E. 613. Some courts
hold that, for a decision to be conclusive, the question involved must have been
presented to the court as necessary to a decision in the case, and directly con-
sidered and decided, and that parties should not be .concluded upon questions
that are decided by mere implication arising from the general disposition of a
case. Gwin v. Waggoner (1893) ii6 Mo. 143, 22 S. W. 71o. The principal case
seeps to hold that a decision is conclusive, as an adjudication, only as to those
questions consciously before the court. This seems to be the better view, for it
is often difficult to ascertain what is necessarily determined by a decision.
PROPERTY-FUTURE INTERESTs-RuLE IN SHELLEY'S CAsE-A conveyance was
made to one Goode, "and after his death to the heirs of his body, their heirs
and assigns forever." Goode, -after birth of issue, sold to the defendants. The
plaintiffs claimed as heirs of the body of Goode. Held, that Goode had but a
life estate, the rule in Shelley's Case not applying and that the plaintiffs should
take as remaindermen. Blythe v). Goode (i92o, C. C. A. 4th) 269 Fed. 544.
The rule in Shelley's Case applies where, after a life estate, a remainder is
limited to.the life-tenant's heirs, or to the heirs of his body, making such a
remainder take effect by descent and giving an inheritable interest to the life
tenant. But heirs or heirs of the body must be used technically to mean an
indefinite succession of the life tenant's issue; and a preliminary question is
always raised as to whether the words used mean such indefinite succession or
designate particular persons at the death of the life tenant, who may now be
the source of the line of descent. In Archer's Case, which started this trend
of decisions, it was decided that a limitation to R. A. and after to the next heir
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male, and to the heirs male of the body of such heir male, did mot come within.
the rule. (599 C. P.) Coke, Pt. I, 66b. In England this interpretation has
been generally limited, due to the fact that at the death of the life tenant -there
can be but one heir, to cases where the word "heir" is used in the singular,
"heirs" necessarily signifying successive generations. Wright v. Pearson (0758,
Ch.) I Amb. 358. Although a slight change in wording may affect the inter-
pretation of the intention of the grantor or testator, so that each case .must be
decided independently, some general conclusions can be drawn. Where the
remainder is to the heirs of the life tenant, their heirs and assigfis, by the weight
of authority, an indefinite succession is meant and the rule applies. Harrison v.
Harris (1914) 245 Pa. 397, 91 Atl. 617; Ryan v. Ryan (1gi) 138 Ark. 362, 211
S. W. 183. Words of similar import have a like. effect; a remainder to the heir
"forever" or "in fee" gives a fee to the life tenant. Silcocks v. Silcdcks [i1g6]
2 Ch. 161; Stathers z. Renz (igi6) 251 Pa. 315, 96 Atl. 717. "In fee simple and
forever" is interpreted in the same way. Roberson v. Moore (1915) 168 N. C.
388, 84 S. E. 351. But a remainder to the "heirs" (in the United States) or
"heir" (in England) "absolutely" has been held not within Shelley's rule. West-
cott v. Meeker (i9og) 144 Iowa, 311, 122 N. W. 964; In re Hussy and Green's
Contract (1921, Ch.) 37 T. L. R. 407. Where the course of descent is.changed,
as where the remainder is limited to the life tenant's bodily heirs and their heirs
general, Shelley's Case is usually held not to apply. "Heirs of the body, their
heirs and assigns," as in the instant case, makes "heirs of the body" words of
purchase. Aetna life Ins. Co. v. Hoppin (1914, C. C. A. 7th) 214 Fed. 928. A
similar interpretation is given to a remainder to heirs of the body in fee simple.
Benson v. Tanner (917) 276 Ill. 594, 115 N. E. 19-; contra, Burton v. Carnahan
(19o6) 38 Ind. App. 612, 78 .N. E. 682. See 29 L. R. A. (N. s.) 963, note.
SuRETYsHIp--CoNTRcTOR's BOND--PAYMENTS To MATERIALMAN AS RELEASE
OF SuRETY.-The defendant surety company gave a bond to secure the faithful
perfo-mance of a building contract. Although not parties to the bond, the
materialmen were expressly protected by its terms. This action was brought
to recover $15,790.13 for material furnished on the job by the plaintiff company,
although it admitted having received more than that amount from the con-
tractor while the building was being erected. The plaintiff knew the source' of
at least part of the funds from which these payments were made, and applied
them to previous debts of the contractor. The plaintiff was also in a position
to file, a lien on a building fund of $15,ooo which had been set aside by the
owner, but failed to do so until- after $io,ooo had been withdrawn. Held, that
the plaintiff could not recover. Alexander Lumber Co. v. Aetna Accident &
Liability Co. (1921, JJl.) 129 N. E. 871.
According to the general rule, a debtor and creditor have the privilege and'
power of determining the application of a payment regardless of the interests
of third parties, such as sureties. Wyandotte Coal Co. v. Wyandotte Paving
Co. (1916) 97 Kan. 203, 154 Pac. 1012; Irving v,. Mutual Trust Co. (0914) 82
N. J. Eq. 629, 9o Atl. 274. There are, however, several recognized exceptions.
See .3 Williston, Contracts (192o) sec. 1804. The authorities are in conflict as
to whether the facts of the instant case come within one of such exceptions.
It has been held that under such circumstances, the surety is discharged.
Columbia Digger Co. v. Sparks (1915, C. C. A. 9th)" 227 Fed. 780; Bross v.
McNicholas (1913) 66 Ore. 42, 133 Pac. 782; but see contra, Chicago Lumber
Co. v. Doiglas (1913) 89 Kan. 308, 131 Pac. 563; People v. Powers (1896) Io8
LMich. 339, 66 N. W. 215. In analogous cases, where money has been received
from a tax collector by a municipality, in ignorance of the source from which
it was derived, the authorities seem to be uniform in holding that such money
can be applied to previous indebtedness, due to default, though detrimental to
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the sureties on the tax collector's bond for the current year. Hudson v. Miles
(19o4) 185 Mass. 582, 71 N. E. 63; Grafton v. Reed (89o) 34 W. Va. 172, 12
S. E. 767. The cases opposed to the holding in the principal case seem to rest
on a sounder basis. There seems to be no reason in the instant case to deny
to the creditor the usual power, in the absence of direction by the debtor, to
apply payments as he sees fit. If the creditor does know the source of the
money, it is the debtor's money and the reason for raising an equity in favor
of the surety is not apparent. Moreover, ther6 is no necessity for protecting
surety companies by creating this equity in their favor, since they can protect
themselves adequately by making proper express reservations in the surety bond.
The fact that the security was reduced by the materialman's laches in filing a
lien could not affect the liability of the surety company. Mere neglect on the
part of a creditor to enforce his claim does not discharge the surety. Lewis v.
Blume (1917) 226 Mass. 505, 116 N. E. 271; Villars v. Palmer (873) 67 Ill.
2o4. Even if a prior lien had been relinquished it would merely discharge the
surety pro tanto. Sterne v. Bank of Vincennes (1881) 79 Ind. 549; Holmes v.
Williams (1898) 177 Ill. 386, 53 N. E. 93. Thus it would seem that the plaintiff
should recover, since neither the application of the -payments to prior indebted-
ness nor the failure on the part of the materialman to utilize possible security
should discharge the surety.
TRusTs-GIFr OF AN UNINDORSED CERTIFICATE OF STOcK-ANTECEDENT POSSES-
SION BY THE Tausva.-The settlor bought and sold all of her securities through
a friend, who kept them in her safe deposit box. The stock was registered in the
settlor's nme and the dividends paid directly to her. A year before her death
they went together to the vault and the settlor told her friend that at her death
the stock was to be distributed among certain beneficiaries. The latter consented
to supervise the distribution on condition that a third party make the actual
delivery to the beneficiaries. Thereafter none of the stock was sold and the
settlor never exercised control over it. She made no will. The trustee was
ready to carry out the trust, but the agent refused to deliver the stock and
notified the public administrator that it was intestate property. The beneficiaries
brought this action to establish the trust, joining as defendants the trustee, the
agent, and the public administrator. Held, that the stock was to be held in trust
to be distributed to the beneficiaries subject to the decedent's life interest in the
dividends. Jenks, P. J., and Putnam, J., dissenting. Orton v. Tannenbaurm
(i92o) I94 App. Div. 214, I85 N. Y. Supp. 68I.
The instant case follows the modern tendency in applying a similar rule to
gifts of non-negotiable choses in action and to gifts of chattels. The early
English cases, by refusing to recognize that any interest in stock qpuld pass by
delivery without indorsement and transfer on tie books, created the anomalous
situation of the donee's being in possession and unable to benefit by it and the
donor's having the legal titlewithout being able to iecover possession. Rummens
v. Hare (1876) L. R. I Exch. Div. i6g. The prevailing American doctrine is
to the effect that, although a transfer on the books is required to vest the legal
title, a valid gift inter vivos is created by the mere delivery of an unindorsed
certificate -of stock. Herbert v. Simson (i195) 220 Mass. 480, io8 N. E. 65;
see (rI918) 27 YALE LAw JOURNAL, 956. This applies whether the gift is absolute
or in trust. Talbot v. Talbot (1911) 32 R. . 72, 78 Atl. 535. Conceding that
a valid gift in trust may be created by delivery, was there a delivery in the instant
case? It would seem logical and desirable to follow again the chattel analogy
and hold that antecedent possession by the donee, coupled with words indicating
a -present intention to make a gift in trust, is sufficient. Stoneham v. Stoneham
[igig] I Ch. i49; Porter v. Gardner (18gi) 6o Hun, 571, 15 N. Y. Supp. 398;
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see NOTES (1920) 20 COL. L. REv. 196; Chaplin, Express Trusts (1897) sec. 83.
The court here found as a fact that the. settlor intended to create a trust
in praesenti. The implied reservation of a life interest in the dividends was held
not to affect the validity of this trust. To the same effect, see Larimer v.
Beardsley (19o6) i3o Iowa, 7o6, 1O7 N. W. 935. The result reached in the instant
case appears to be most desirable in that it tends to break down the rigid rule
distinguishing negotiable choses in action from other kinds of personal property.
WILLS-WHEN AFrER-AcQuIRED REAL ESTATE PAssEs.-The will of the
testatrix contained the following devise: "I give, devise and bequeath to my
husband . . . all of my personalty and real estate, as follows, to wit:"
followed by a specific description of the land devised. After the execution of
this will the testatrix acquired more real estate. Held, that such after-
acquired realty passed under the will. McCulloch, C. J., dissenting. Brock v.
Turner (1921, Ark.) 227 S. W. 597.
It was well settled at common law and under the early English and American
statutes, thit, since a testamentary devise was in the nature of a conveyance, one
could not devise realty which he did not own at the time his will was executed,
though he expressly so provided. Bunter v. Coke (17o7, K. B.) I Salk. 237;
Brewster v. McCall (1842) 15 Conn. 274. But, under statutes now obtaining in
most of the American states, after-acquired realty will pass under a general
devise of realty if such is shown to have been the intention of the testator.
These statutes are not uniform, however. The statutes of many states would seem
to require that such intention clearly appear upon the face of the will. Wright
v. Masters (1gog) 8I Oh. St. 3o4, 9o N. E. 797; In re Pierce (1898) 20 R. I. 38o,
39 Atl. 43o. But it need'not be declared in express words. Winchester V. Foster
(1849, Mass.) 3 Cush. 366; Woman's M]iss. Soc. v. Mead (189o) 131 11. 338, 23
N. E. 6o3. Construing such statutes as putting realty and personalty on the
same footing regarding testamentary disposition, some states hold that a general
devise under such statutes passes after-acquired realty. Briggs vt. Briggs (1886)
69 Iowa, 617, 29 N. W. 632; Welborn v. Townsend (1889) 31 S. C. 408, IO S. E.
96. The statutes pf a majority of the states provide that a general devise is
presumed to pass after-acquired real estate unless a contrary intention mani-
festly appears. Redwood v. Howison (1917) 129 Md. 577, 99 AtI. 863; Williams
v. Brice (1902) 201 Pa. 595, 51; AtI. 376. Under such statutes the word "now"in a devise is said, generally, not to be one of limitation, but is read as of the
time of death. Hodgkins v. Hodgkbts (igo8) 123 App. Div. io, 1o8 N. Y. Supp.
173; Sussex Trust v. Polite .(igig, Del.) io6 Atl. 54. The statutes of a few
other states, like that of Arkansas involved in the principal case, merely give to
one the power of making a devise of all of his real and personal property, without
specifically referring to his intention as to after-acquired realty. Under these
statutes, a general devise has been held to pass after-acquired real estate if the
intention is sufficiently made out. Mueller v. Buenger (i9o4) 184 Mo. 458, 83
S. W. 458. But the presumption in favor of a general devise in the above
instances is said not to arise when the testator expressly, or by clear implication,
refers to the state of things existing at the time of making the will. Wright v.
Masters, supra; Hines v. Mercer (1899) 125 N. C. 71, 34 S. E. io6. The
decision in the principal case appears to rest upon an earlier decision, in which
the common-law rule was expressly repudiated and it was held that a general
devise passed all the real estate possessed by the testator at the time of his
death. Patty v. Goolsby (1888) 5I Ark. 61, 9 S. W. 846. The-application of
that rule to the principal case seems to be difficult, however. A devise so
specifically qualified as in the will here involved can scarcely be said to be
general.
